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Artistic culture: The Trial by Freedom 
Daniil Dondurei 
 
The Official Blueprints and Unofficial Realities of Soviet Artistic 
Culture 
"The poet in Russia is more than just a poet." This line from Evgeny 
Yevtushenko's verse hints at the unique place that artistic culture has 
occupied in Russia 's tragic history. From Radishchev and Tolstoy to 
Solzhenitsyn and Tarkovsky, writers, painters, film makers -- cultural 
producers of every kind -- undertook to explain Russian society to itself. 
The common view that depicts Soviet art as subservient to ideology is well 
grounded in facts, but it tends to conceal as much as it reveals. Soviet 
artists served the state, and thus could not help but being influenced by 
the nation's poisonous political climate. But they also thrived in the 
pungent native soil, soared high in their struggle against the system, 
carved out an inner space where they could experiment with their craft 
and turn their humiliation into inspired works of art. Soviet artistic culture 
is a paradoxical tangle of forces, impulses, and relations generated by the 
nation's spiritual and social currents that defy attempts to dispose of them 
in one fell swoop. 
Take, for instance, the ideological pressure under which Soviet artists had 
to labor for some 70 years. It weighed heavily on artistic creativity, but it 
also inspired an unofficial art which flourished on the Soviet Union 's 
cultural reservations. The same goes for popular or mass culture. It 
shaped a multi-layered mythological consciousness steeped in official 
values and beliefs; at the same time, it fulfilled a certain therapeutical and 
compensatory function by fostering an ideal of closely-knit human 
relations based on love, friendship, and ethical concerns. Film makers 
Grigory Aleksandrov and Ivan Pyriev, painters Aleksander Deineka and 
Petr Konchalovsky, composers Aram Khachaturian and Isaak Dunaevsky 
did sell themselves to the powers, but in the process, they managed not 
only to save their lives but also to produce some genuinely innovative art. 
Russian Marxists did not create tension between the state and the artist -- 
this tension predated the October Revolution -- but they exacerbated the 
situation by insisting that the artist must subordinate his creative impulses 
to the noble goal of improving people's lives. Pushing the idea to the 
logical extreme, Bolsheviks proclaimed that serving the common good was 
the mark of genuine art and that the failure to subordinate one's artistry 
to the revolutionary cause could be taken as the proof that one did not 
belong to the profession. In 1918, People's Commissar, A. Lunacharsky, 
promised that the Soviet power would "mercilessly purge the temple of art 
from all those who are out to sell it and poison people's minds." Soviet art 
had to be dedicated exclusively to the propaganda and education of "the 
widest masses of working people." According to this ideologeme, all 
unaffiliated, nonpartisan, and foreign artistic experience was judged to be 
suspect, alien, or bourgeois, consequently incompatible with the building 
of a new socialist culture and personality. [1] 
"Taming of the art," as Yuri Elagin aptly called this process, required that 
all cultural institutions be nationalized, governed from one center, 
subjected to censorship, and used to promote uniformity among 
artists. Agitprop or the Department of Agitation and Propaganda was set 
up in 1920 at the Party Central Committee and charged with the task of 
"guiding the political education in the RSFSR [the Russian Federation ] in 
its entirety." Along side this overarching agency and under its watchful 
eyes, flourished other state and public organizations responsible for what 
Soviet ideologists liked to call "cultural building." The most important 
among these organizations turned out to be "creative unions" that, 
beginning in the 30s, moved to enlist in their ranks all writers, painters, 
composers, theater artists, film makers, and architects. Creative unions 
helped the party monitor the artistic process in the country, and their 
leaders did whatever necessary to insure that their rank and file members 
follow the doctrine of socialist realism. 
The official artistic culture was distinguished by its totality. The heroes 
brought to life by Soviet artists had to be universally admired, be this 
Furmanov's Chapaev, Gaidar's Timur, or Mikhalkov's Uncle Stepa -- a 
noble representative of the ruthless Soviet militia. This does not mean 
that the aesthetic doctrine had remained unchanged throughout the 
Soviet era. Periodically, new campaigns would be instigated to promote 
naturalism, everdayism, academism, documentalism or other artistic fads 
deemed to be the order of the day. Somewhere along the lines, Ilya 
Erenburg even dared to attack photographic realism that "sells itself as a 
reflection of real life." Still, each innovation had to be sanctioned from 
above, and it remained in vogue as along as it had the official seal of 
approval, which could be revoked at any time. 
The keen interest that the party took in Soviet art comes across in lengthy 
broadsides published in Pravda, the communist party's official newspaper. 
In 1936, a series of articles appeared in this authoritative source, bearing 
such eloquent titles as "Chaos Instead of Music," "Falsehood in the Ballet," 
"Cacophony in Architecture," and "About the Defiling Painters." During the 
Great Terror systematically carried out by Stalin, artist's aesthetic 
convictions were literally a matter of life and death. Every poetic word, 
paint brush, or dance step was closely scrutinized to insure that it adhered 
to an ideologically sound pattern. Whenever the latest campaign would 
break out, be this the struggle against rootless cosmopolites or the 
celebration of Soviet multi-ethnic art, artists had to show their 
enthusiasm. The emphasis on Soviet classics, the nation's economic 
achievements, or the people's victory in World War II were periodically 
decreed as the most important artistic themes, which then would become 
more or less mandatory for all art practitioners. In the same fashion, the 
Communist Party Central Committee or the KGB departments responsible 
for art could instigate a national debate about the latest theater premier 
or painting exhibit, as was the case with the 1973 premier of "The Master 
and Margarita," a play directed by Yuri Liubimov, or with the (in)famous 
art exhibit staged in 1975 at the Palace of Achievements of People's 
Economy. The public's real interest and opinion did not count in such 
carefully orchestrated discussions, which were planned ahead by the party 
bosses, who used their power to settle scores with nonconformist 
intellectuals and to reward the politically correct ones. The latter learned 
to navigate between official values and the shifting political currents of the 
day. Even when the audience clearly favored one artistic product over 
another, the outcome did not mean much, for honorariums and praise 
lavished on the artists had little to do with the proceeds from the show. 
The law of supply and demand was inoperative under the monopoly 
conditions prevailing in Soviet art. The masses might crave Hollywood 
movies, but the authorities refused to order more than ten Hollywood 
films a year. About as many films were imported annually from India . 
Box-office considerations could never override ideological imperatives. Any 
film, record or book was deemed to be a priori "unprofitable," if it did not 
conform to correct political standards. While the communist party 
tirelessly monitored artistic products for signs of ideological infractions, it 
strenuously avoided examining the economic consequences of its hare-
brained schemes. Artistic production in the Soviet Union had to submit to 
the same principles of centralized planning and cope with the same 
shortages and distribution gaps as the rest of Soviet economy. Thus, the 
State Cinema Committee determined which movie theater would show a 
certain film on a given day, with every single movie showing in every 
single movie theater following, at least in theory, a centrally approved 
plan. This absurd supercentralization persisted for decades and survived 
into the early perestroika years. 
According to Osip Mandelshtam, the works created by Soviet artists could 
be broken down into two categories: "permitted" and "created without 
permission." "I want to spit on those writers who write what is permitted," 
wrote Mandelshtam in his "Fourth Prose," "I want to hit them over their 
heads with a stick. . . . I would prohibit such writers to marry and have 
children." [2] Few authors dared to explore the realm of the unpermitted 
subjects and ideas during the Soviet reign. Most dutifully followed the 
ideologically proven path. Some remained ambivalent, alternatively trying 
to march in lockstep with the masses and strike on their own, to obey the 
party line and express their uncensored feelings. Very few shunned the 
requisite conformism altogether and dared to challenge the monolithic 
value system decreed by the regime. 
It goes without saying that artistic life in such a complex modern society 
as the Soviet Union could never be fully controlled from one center. 
Things had to go awry, as orders were passed along the chain of 
command. There were also internal policy divisions within the communist 
party itself, which Soviet artists learned to exploit. During the 
Khrushchev-inspired debate over Stalin's crimes, for instance, a number 
of works was published, including Solzhenitsyn's "Ivan Denisovich," which 
would not have had a ghost of a chance at other junctures in Soviet 
history. The official blueprint for Soviet artistic culture failed to suppress 
the unofficial reality, which remained far more diverse than the taboo-
laden party guidelines would have it. Various unofficial strands of artistic 
life sprang to life after Stain's death and even prosper in the relatively 
liberal times unleashed by Nikita Khrushchev. In addition to the quasi-
official ranking system that arranged all Soviet artists according to their 
contribution to building a socialist society, there was an unofficial 
hierarchy that assigned prestige to artists according to their skills, talents, 
and personal courage. An artistic event frowned upon by ideological 
watchdogs could be hailed by the nonconformist intelligentsia, the 
information about it swiftly spread by the word of mouth. Similarly, a 
highly-touted art exhibit by a state-decorated painter could be boycotted 
by independent artists. 
It would be wrong, therefore, to judge Soviet artistic culture by official 
pronouncements, formal reviews, and award ceremonies, which 
consistently glossed over the complex realities of artistic life in the Soviet 
Union . Hidden behind the "iron curtain" was a complicated process that 
absorbed within its bounds bizarre, utterly incongruent elements: the 
unlimited power of ancient war lords, feudal corporate gilds, predatory 
capitalist practices, and a centralized system of aesthetic education. When 
the Communist Party finally yielded its monopoly on power, it left behind a 
murky legacy that included along with the ecological and spiritual 
Chernobyls the diverse cultural achievements with a continuous appeal to 
the cultural elite and mass consumers alike. After all, official Soviet 
culture was produced not just by the witless political opportunists but also 
by highly talented artists. Hence, mistaken are those progressive liberals 
who dismiss Soviet artistic culture in toto and treat its products 
exclusively as ideological ciphers devoid of artistic merit. 
Soviet Artistic Culture Under Perestroika 
The Gorbachev era was marked by the erosion of ideological taboos and 
the dismantling of Socialist Realism. Censorship was rapidly losing its grip 
on the artistic spirit. The party line that used to separate right from 
wrong, the aesthetically meritorious from the aesthetically worthless, was 
now open to second-guessing. By the late 80s, most artists discarded 
their ingrained habits of self-censorship; some dug out evidence of their 
nonconformist past and proudly paraded it before the public. 
Spearheading the revolt in the arts, members of the Cinema Union 
refused to reelect at their fifth national congress officially approved 
candidates for the organization's top offices -- an act of breathtaking 
courage by the standards of 1986. Long-humiliated and repressed, the 
artistic intelligentsia savored its revenge against the "art critics in civilian 
clothes" who did the party's and KGB's bidding among artists in the past. 
The earlier-suppressed art works by Soviet and foreign authors were 
exhumed and made public for the first time. In 1986, the Stanislavsky 
Theater staged Beckett's play, "The Chairs," and in 1987, the Ermolaeva 
Theater produced his "Waiting for Godot." In 1988, Novy Mir published 
Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago. The same year, an immensely popular 
counter-cultural film, "Little Vera," was released in Soviet movie theaters. 
Next year, the Sovremennik Theater staged a play by Soviet dissident 
writer, Vladimir Voinovich. Meanwhile, nonconformist works by Soviet 
artists began reaching audiences abroad, some earning top honors at 
international competitions. All these novelties made abundantly clear that 
Soviet artistic culture was undergoing a major, perhaps revolutionary, 
change. 
"In my view, Russia is the only country today where there exists artistic 
freedom. It is hard to say how long this situation will last. Freedom always 
faces challenges. One of its enemies is the market, the other -- 
censorship." [3] This remarkable testimony belongs to Andrey 
Konchalovsky, a Soviet film maker, who knew first hand the artistic scene 
in both Soviet Russia and the capitalist West. Indeed, perestroika offered 
Soviet artists golden opportunities for free self-expression. Political 
constraints no longer stifled artistic creativity. At the same time, the 
paternalistic socialist state continued to take care of artists' needs, 
effectively relieving them from any economic responsibility. Every third 
film produced during the heyday of perestroika failed to recoup a tenth of 
its production cost. Hundreds of millions of rubles were lost, but since 
these were "nobody's rubles" generated by the still socialist economy, 
nobody complained. The question of the place that art should occupy in a 
postcommunist society did not hit Russian artists until after perestroika 
was nearly over. When Eric Weisman, ex-vice chairman of Warner 
Brothers, told a Moscow audience during his lecture about American 
cinema that "the movie director is worth as much as the proceeds from his 
last movie," Russian film makers were visibly upset. Such crass 
materialism seemed incompatible with the artists' lofty aspirations. 
[4] The Russian artistic intelligentsia always believed that "money could 
only ruin art," that the artist "must chose between commercial success 
and his talent." In the land of dying socialism, commercial success still 
appears to be a random event, the luck of the draw, which might bring 
the artist a fortune, but which is in no way indicative of his work's artistic 
merit. If anything, success at the box office bodes ill for the development 
of a true artist, whose calling is to create timeless spiritual values, not to 
please the public. 
Still, many artists took notice that the changed political climate might 
bring one spectacular financial success. In July of 1988, at a major auction 
organized by a Western company, four paintings produced by a practically 
unknown artist, Grigory Bruskin, fetched $700,000 -- the biggest personal 
profit ever made in the history of Russian art. [5] That Russian artists 
could spark interest in the West and have some real market value became 
clear from numerous art exhibits, film festivals, and musicians' contests 
that showcased Russian art abroad. Whoever had incurred the wrath of 
the communist authorities in the past could now expect sympathetic 
hearing abroad. The popularity that Mikhail Gorbachev and his reforms 
enjoyed in the West must have rubbed off on Soviet artists. True or not, 
ex-dissident artists were perceived in the West as Gorbachev's soul-
mates, active carriers of liberal culture who helped bring the end of the 
cold war. "Sotsart," an artistic current that mocked socialist values by 
hyperextending socialist symbols and images, gained special favor in the 
West. The works by its representatives were prominently featured not 
only in elite art magazines but also in mass consumption publications, 
such as the Reader's Digest. One by one, all barriers to art exports from 
Russia fell off. 
Just as Soviet art found a niche in Western markets, Russian emigre art 
made its way back home. Brodsky, Limonov, Willy Tokarev -- no border 
patrol could any longer keep the ex-Soviet artists from regaining mass 
audience, entering the local markets in Russia, affecting the fortunes of 
publishers and art entrepreneurs. The art production in Russia increasingly 
came under the sway of market mechanisms. Indicative in this respect is 
the fate of the publishing industry in postcommunist Russia. 
It is well known that word -- written or oral -- always had an 
extraordinary significance in Russia . As the saying goes, "In Russia, word 
is deed." This old saw is literally true: a word could land an individual in 
jail or deliver a person from bondage. Having a strict control over words 
uttered and printed had been a high priority for Russia 's rulers, 
communist and noncommunist. As soon as the communist party began to 
lose its monopoly on power, Russia saw an explosion of free speech. The 
floodgates were flung open in 1989 when party apparatchiks made a last-
ditch effort to stem the rise of glasnost by limiting circulation of the most 
popular publications. This clumsy attempt failed miserably. Thousands of 
new magazines and periodicals hit the newsstands, catering to the public's 
insatiable appetite for free information. At the same time, the publishing 
industry experienced an unprecedented boom. Artistic books, astrological 
treatises, sex manuals, self-help guides -- whatever the Soviet reader 
wanted to know about anything and everything was now printed and 
made available in regular book stores or make-shift stands set up by 
private book vendors. 
Just as the centuries-old civilization of unfreedom of speech has expired, 
however, "the most reading nation on earth" turned a deaf ear to the free 
word. Within a few years of total glasnost, the public lost its interest in 
reading literature and listening to speeches. Thick literary journals that 
once boasted circulation in the millions now print less than 5% percent of 
copies they used to circulate during the height of perestroika. Once 
immensely popular newspapers could not sell enough copies to support 
themselves and had to beg for government subsidies to stay in business. 
Book prices have skyrocketed, making the most sought-after volumes 
unaffordable for the average buyer. Even when prices are within reach, 
consumers often chose to spend their money elsewhere. Ex-Soviet citizens 
have grown tired with the orgy of glasnost. Kliamkin, Shmelev, Popov, 
and dozens of other prominent opinion makers who once captivated the 
entire nation with their fiery oratory and inspired essays have all but 
disappeared from the political center stage. The establishments that made 
headway during perestroika are being revamped under pressure from the 
market. Well established bookstores are forced to sublet part of their 
space to other businesses. In the Fall of 1992, the passerby could spot 
brand-new Cadillacs, Pontiacs , and Shevrolets prominently displayed 
among the book shelves waiting to be taken out from the well-known 
bookstore nestled on the first floor of the newspaper Trud. The store 
administrators had to curtail their declining business to make room for the 
glamour business of the future. In a striking metaphor, shiny cars 
symbolizing capitalism assumed the honorary place inside the building, 
while the books epitomizing Russia 's precapitalist past were ready to be 
thrown out onto the streets. 
Similar metamorphoses marked the transition to postcommunist realities 
in other cultural domains. The first Russian film market dates back to 
1988, when movie distributors wrestled the right to buy films with an eye 
to their profit potential rather than ideological purity. This revolt spelled 
the end of the old communist bondage system that mandated which 
pictures were to be filmed, which shown to the public, and which 
indefinitely shelved. Foreign products inundated the Russian TV and movie 
theaters, their share jumping from thirty five percent in 1986 to eighty 
five percent in 1989. [6] About the same time, pirated video tapes poured 
into the country. The growth in cultural import was accompanied by the 
explosion of domestic artistic production. Hundreds of new art galleries, 
movie studios, theater groups, and musical collectives sprouted in urban 
centers. Giant companies, like Roskontsert and Mosfilm, managed to rid 
themselves of state control and made tentative moves toward financial 
independence. 
Given this explosion of artistic activity, one would expect public interest in 
art to soar as well. But as with the publishing industry, the reality turned 
out to be less palatable. As soon as creative endeavor was freed from all 
ideological fetters, Russian artists confronted a formidable challenge: the 
sharp decline of public interest in art. In 1986, the cinema industry lost 
money. Movie theater attendance dropped from nearly two billion tickets 
sold in 1986 to 950 million in 1988. Concert halls and theater houses 
could not attract enough people to fill one third of the seats. [7] Ironically, 
interest in cultural events evaporated as soon as every Russian (and not 
just the well-connected members of the cultural elite) were allowed to 
watch once-forbidden movies of Pasolini and listen to the much-vilified 
music of Schonberg. Even the pornographic films that flooded the Russian 
market during the late 80s failed to arrest the steep decline in the nation's 
cultural consumption. The chronic shortages of cultural goods endemic to 
socialist society finally came to an end, and along with it, it seems, 
vanished the Russian public's yen for art. 
This does not mean, of course, that Russians have no more interest in 
cultural and artistic products. What happened was that artistic 
consumption shifted from the public arena to private homes, which by the 
end of the 80s became the locus of cultural life in the country. According 
to the sociological data gathered in this period, Russian citizens spent 5 to 
6 times more time and 8 to 10 times more money on home entertainment 
and private cultural consumption than on attendance in theaters, 
concerts, art exhibits, and other public cultural outlets. Something 
strange, also, happened to the quality of cultural consumption. [8] The 
Russian intelligentsia in particular used to pride itself on its highly 
selective approach to what its members read or viewed; new findings 
indicated that intellectuals and nonintellectuals alike were watching TV 
programs across the board, as though fearing that life itself would grind to 
a halt if the tube went blind. Twenty-seven percent of viewers reported 
that their TV sets were turned on even when nobody was watching. "I 
don't like what I see, but I enjoy watching it anyhow," wrote an avid TV 
viewer in his letter to the editor. Another one angrily denounced a TV 
station because "I had to stay up until midnight to watch the garbage you 
put on the screen, as if I didn't have anything better to do." 
Changing public attitudes took their toll on artists. Some prominent film 
directors (Gleb Panfilov, Elen Klimov, Aleksei German, Andrei Smirnov) 
stopped making movies. Well-known stage directors (Anatoly Vasiliev, Lev 
Dodin, Kama Ginkas) do more work abroad than at home. The same is 
true about Russia 's leading musicians (Vladimir Spivakov, Yuri Kitaenko, 
Alfred Schnitke) and painters (Ilya Kabakov, Leonid Purygin, Igor 
Ganikovsky). Still others went the commercial route, consciously catering 
to mass market tastes, however distasteful the final product. Emigration, 
the bulk of which was comprised by the intelligentsia, reached 200,000 
people by the end of the 80s. 
The Art, the Artist, and the Quasi-Market 
Let us now examine more closely the muddled relationship between art 
and market in the post-Soviet era, as exemplified by the Russian film 
industry. From 1988 on, the Russian artistic intelligentsia, including film 
makers, had most of their dreams come true. There were virtually no 
limits to what intellectuals could say about their society, government, and 
political system. Virtually all sexual taboos were abandoned. The state 
underwrote artistic work with little or no regard for its financial viability, 
which gave artists the incentive to take up ambitious projects. The 
Russian cinema industry worked overtime. Producers, screen writers, 
actors, stage hands -- everybody had as much work as one could handle. 
Financiers aggressively invested in risky movie projects, seemingly 
without concern for economic realities. [9] Artists did not stand to make 
much money from their undertakings, but they did not have to worry 
about starving either, even though the ultimate product might be a 
financial flop. The socialist system continued to subsidize creative activity, 
never mind that the artists lampooned socialism and its byproducts. There 
were still nomenklatura bureaucrats with close ties to the party who had 
to okey the project, but sensing the changing of the guards, they did not 
miss a chance to show their benevolent support for perestroika art. 
This situation, which lasted for about three years, produced disastrous 
results. Since the path-breaking picture "Little Vera," only one home-
grown movie made the top-twenty list of the country's most popular films. 
No amount of sex and violence inundating the screen could change the 
general trend: movie-theater attendance dropped four-fold between 1988 
and 1992. And even when the Russian economy reached the breaking 
point and made it impossible to continue generous state subsidies of art, 
movies continued to be made in the face of this economically absurd 
situation. 
One reason why the movie industry did not go bankrupt under these 
trying circumstances was the shadow economy that targeted the movie 
business for its money-laundrying schemes. There is a lot that Russian 
artists could learn from Russian entrepreneurs when it comes to 
imagination and creativity. [10] Say, there is a film produced by a 
company for two million rubles (prices are still in line with the Gorbachev 
era inflation rates). It is purchased by a phantom company which has no 
relationship to the movie industry whatsoever. The studio where the film 
was shot had all of its expenses reimbursed, plus an arbitrary established 
profit of some million and a half rubles was paid to the producers by the 
shady company that now owns the movie. The company that purchased 
distribution rights doctors the documents that attest to the fabulous 
proceeds of ten million rubles from movie runs in the nation's movie 
theaters. From that point on, illegal money made from unrelated shady 
deals are legitimized. You can bet that the principals in this game were 
paid off with hefty bribes that made them rich by Russian standards. 
Meanwhile, the film in question has not been shown to the public once. 
Another scheme would have the producer get the money from a bank to 
pay for equipment, studio space, and actors' fees, spend a whole lot less 
for actual shooting, and in the end, present the resultant film as an 
experimental product of such extraordinary aesthetic quality that it could 
not possibly be understood by the movie-going public. Nobody ever sees 
the film, the investors are bought out (remember, money is nobody's!), 
and the auditors are still such a rarity that there is no point worrying 
about them. In the end, the lost money is written off as a bad investment 
by the state. 
Or else, the studio director could strike a deal with a foreign company that 
wants to use local facilities, show a fictitious price tag in the official 
documents, and then split the difference with the foreign partners. The 
studio director's personal profit could be deposited in a bank account 
abroad. All this in spite of the fact that the studio facilities are not 
privately owned, that they still belong to the state, or which is the same 
thing, they are collectively owned by the Russian people. [11] Add to this 
a chance to speculate on the changing conversion rates when you do 
transactions in both hard currency and soft (in Russia they are called 
"wooden") rubles, and you can see that the movie business had a lot of 
fresh opportunities in the post-Soviet period. 
We should keep in mind, however, that local cinema had something to 
gain from all this wheeling and dealing. Hollywood paid dollars to Mosfilm, 
the preeminent Russian movie company, for Andrey Konchalovsky's 
picture "The Inner Circle," and the proceeds more than made up for the 
losses that Mosfilm incurred by producing two dozen Russian films. Similar 
stories come from Lenfilm and other leading movie companies that have 
their own production base and offer foreign companies their facilities. In 
those heady years, studio administrators did not look too closely at the 
projects undertaken by local directors, as long as the latter showed an 
overall profit. As to Russian film makers, they never cared that much 
about box office success. High brow pictures, the ones that win prizes at 
the international movie festivals, rarely attract much attention from the 
general public, anyhow. As long as the artists are allowed to exercise their 
artistic freedom, they are more than willing to shoot pictures for each 
others. 
Thanks to this inane political economy of artistic production, films were 
shot that could not be sold, or sold without being copied, or copied 
without being distributed to theaters. "The new Russians," those 
entrepreneurs who sponsored many films in the perestroika and 
postperestroika years, did not care much about quality. The cult of 
hopelessness, also known as chernukha, permeated the movies of this 
period. Under the pretense of being truthful to reality, financial mentors 
encouraged artists to use one color, one emotional tonality, one cruel 
method to elicit the viewer's response. 
Even after the Soviet Union collapsed, its economy continued to churn out 
products that were not meant for consumption, that were not designed to 
make profit, that were produced for some mysterious purposes having 
nothing to do with art. For all the talk about profit, marketing, cost-
accounting, and so on, Russia still has no market in place. At best we can 
talk about a quasi-market that imitates its external forms. This is not to 
deny that revolutionary changes have taken place in the last few years in 
financing, production, and distribution of art in Russia . But the central for 
market economy relationship between the producer and the consumer 
remains profoundly distorted. The Russian market is still largely immune 
from the law of supply and demand. Nor is there any credible system of 
accounting that would allow a bona fide investor or economist to make an 
informed judgment about the industry conditions. There is no national 
statistical agency that can track the data and report on federal and local 
trends. You cannot be sure how many studios are open for business at 
any given point, how many viewers saw a particular picture, what was the 
production cost, and so on. All this is a commercial secret. Credible 
information is a luxury in a country that, defying Marx, is moving from 
mature socialism via eternal feudalism toward primitive capitalism. Or 
could it be that reliable information is a barrier to relentless wheeling and 
dealing? Here comes to mind the words of the Marquise de Custine, the 
19th century Frenchman, who travelled to Russia and observed her 
inimitable mores: "In theory, everything seems so overregulated that one 
can hardly live under this regime. But in practice, exceptions abound, so 
much so that the resultant chaos and contradictions make you wonder 
how on earth one could govern the country under these circumstances." 
[12] 
Russian artists are struggling to shake loose their old shackles and adjust 
to the new economic conditions, but in the process they discover that the 
old artistic culture -- cliche-ridden, politically-stifling, full of envy and 
petty rivalries -- was not without its graces. For all its absurdities, it bred 
a sense of belonging and solidarity that comes from being a member of an 
exclusive guild. Like a centaur, Soviet artistic culture spliced together and 
made possible the coexistence of diverse interests and groups. It fed a 
mythology that was familiar to all, that united under one umbrella all 
those exposed to the same principles, even though some of these 
principles were experienced by as hated official stereotypes. At least there 
was a feeling of collective injustice, of shared fate, of a common dead end 
where any artist could be hounded by ideological watchdogs. And now this 
cozy feeling of negative and positive togetherness is gone, artistic space is 
being totally revamped, and those who inhabit it find themselves 
competing for the same resources, divided by the market forces more 
than they ever were by ideological differences. The aesthetics of socialist 
surrealism has fallen by the wayside; the artist is thrown to his own 
devices; at last, he is free. But the creative boom promised by vulgar 
sociology has failed to materialize. "I am not sure why," confides Aleksei 
German, "but we made our best movies when stagnation reigned supreme 
and everything was prohibited." [13] 
Russia as an Artistic Colony of the West 
Now that we have examined the shady transactions between the quasi-
market and Russian artistic culture, we can turn to the relationship 
between the state, the artist, and the local and international markets. 
Specifically, we shall try to understand the impact of the international art 
market on Russian art and the policies through which the Russian state is 
trying to regulate artistic activity. 
The fine arts have always been among the most conservative domains of 
Russian artistic culture. It is all the more astounding how quickly the 
practitioners in this field have adjusted themselves to postsocialist 
realities. Within a few years, Soviet painters and craftsmen were attending 
international art auctions, forming joint ventures with Western customers, 
selling their ware for hard currency, and opening bank accounts abroad. 
The explanation is rather simple: painting is a labor-intensive art that 
does not require sophisticated technology and equipment, or for that 
matter, mass audience. In the old Soviet Union , it was practiced by 
individuals who might have quarrelled with the socialist state, but who 
managed to carve out a niche for themselves and, in relative obscurity, 
perfected their skills and developed innovative ideas. Painters, animation 
artists, craftsmen, and other fine art practitioners did not have to do as 
much catching-up with the West as artists in some other fields. When 
liberal reforms rolled in, they were ready to come out of the closet fully 
equipped for the new deal. However, the state saw the field's considerable 
potential as a source of hard currency and it geared its tax policy 
accordingly. More than half of the profits made by the artists have to be 
returned to the state in the form of taxes. If a transaction between the 
Russian artist and the Western customer involves hard currency, the state 
prefers to keep the dollars, Deutsche marks, franks and pay the artist the 
after-tax portion of his profit in rubles. But the economic strength of the 
ruble does not compare with that of freely convertible currencies. Nor are 
Russian art collectors in a position to pay top-notch prices for national art 
(an art work that could be sold abroad for thousands of dollars would not 
fetch a fraction of this amount at home). As a result, the artist is placed in 
a situation where he is either going to cheat a state that tries to rob him 
and his dealer or to resettle in the West. Russian artists keep in foreign 
banks anywhere between 50 to 60 million dollars, according to some 
conservative estimates. All the participants in this charade -- dealers, 
gallery administrators, collectors, and of course artists -- are convinced 
that they are being cheated, that somebody is out to deprive them of their 
fair share of profit. The pressure is mounting for all those involved in fine 
arts to make a killing, evade the taxes, and then bid goodby to this 
monstrous, inefficient, corrupt system. 
Our very best artists, both in fine and performing arts, leave the country 
in droves in hope of escaping the clutches of the sputtering economy. 
Painters, craftsmen, composers, musicians -- the whole orchestras and 
ballet schools -- are bidding goodby to their homeland and settling in the 
West. The best Russian composers are now permanently residing in 
Germany . Even more ominously, the second string musicians, dancers, 
singers, philologists, and architects are straining to land a contract abroad 
as teachers, coaches, chorus line performers -- whatever could get them 
out of the sinking country. Most of them have no wish to leave their 
country permanently, but they believe they have to bide their time abroad 
until things back home settle enough to afford them a half-decent living. 
A related problem is the tendency to gear all artistic output to export 
needs. Consciously and unconsciously, Russian artists today strive to 
adjust their priorities and criteria to Western standards. They are trying 
hard to please potential customers aborad, and along the line neglect their 
own creative impulses. The dictate of the Western markets could be no 
less stifling than the standards laid out by Suslov's Politburo. Whether the 
artist follows Socialist Realism or places himself in the service of his new 
employer, he has to do somebody else's bidding. For some Russian artists, 
it was easier to submit to the hated ideological strictures of the past when 
there seemed to be no other choice than to subordinate one's artistic 
impulses to free market demands. 
If Russia ever was an artistic superpower, it does not seem to be one any 
longer. There is an uneasy feeling in the air that the country has turned 
into an artistic colony of the West. It is reinforced by scores of art dealers 
and entrepreneurs rummaging Moscow for artistic bargains, feeling like 
Victorian Englishmen in Africa or India . Nonetheless, superpower habits 
and pretenses are dying hard, even in the face of mounting evidence that 
the nation's standards of living are on par with, if not Lesosto than 
certainly Thailand . Meanwhile, unofficial art, this fountain spring of 
creativity in the past, has virtually disappeared. [14] The spiritual 
opposition that fed this uncensored artistic endeavor has been sapped. It 
was easier for the artist to assume a defiant stance when Zhdanov , 
Suslov, and Ligachev wagged their fingers at artists and threatened to put 
them in jail. [15] With the doublethink and the multi-layered aesthetic 
sensibilities it engendered becoming the thing of the past -- the artistic 
intelligentsia has little to nourish its nonconformist impulses. 
The New Aesthetics and Mass Culture 
Official Soviet ideology prided itself on creating a state with "mass 
aesthetic literacy," "the highest prestige of art," and "genuinely free 
artistic activity." None of these cliches withstood the test of time. We can 
size up the situation by taking a closer look at current TV programming 
and examining the manner in which mass media shapes popular culture. 
If you watch Russian TV today for any length of time, you are likely to 
conclude that the Russian viewer must know English to watch the news, 
appreciate a movie, or understand advertisement. A synchronized Russian 
translation could be provided, depending on the program and its sponsors' 
agenda. Nothing new here: English may well become a universal language 
for the global media-market civilization of the future, but the pace of 
change is staggering. 
Take the children's program "Rock-lesson" that first aired in 1992. The 
program hosts are a sixteen year old girl, symbolically named "Barbie" 
after an internationally acclaimed doll, and a young boy Vania, apparently 
born after the death of Leonid Brezhnev. Vania asks his counterpart all 
sorts of questions that might interest members of his generation, like how 
to dance rap and hip-hop, how to dress up in order to resemble the dance 
machine M. C. Hammer, what is love and how to make out. The national 
children's audience, which includes kids from provincial towns like Syzran ' 
and Vologda , are instructed how to look like Americans and act like the 
average European. One might think that Russian children have already 
emigrated and cannot waste a day without learning the hippest dance 
step, tuning in on the top-ten show, or finding out the latest development 
in the sensational rape trial of the American heavy-weight boxer, Mike 
Tyson. The pirated Hollywood movies and the Hollywood-style 
programming that jam Russian TV do far better job at changing the 
country's centuries-old mind-set than all of Yeltsin decrees taken together. 
We can judge this from a survey conducted in 1991 among six year old 
Moscovites. When researchers asked Moscow kindergarten graduates, 
"Who do you love the most?", the answer was: mother, father, Chip and 
Dale, captain Power, and only then . . . grandma. 
Do not rush to conclude, however, that American values dominate Russian 
mass culture. Russians may be dreaming about a trip to Disneyland and a 
taste of burger at Mcdonalds, but when it comes to loftier matters, they 
crave the Mexican soap opera "The Rich One's Are Crying, Too." Very few 
viewers missed entirely this sensational series that Russian TV 
programmers aired a few years ago. It broke all the rating records, easily 
outstripping in popularity American blockbusters and tying the nation to 
their screens for months in a row. I do not know if guns fell silent in 
Nagorno-Karabakh where Armenians and Azeris were fighting, but it is a 
fact that viewers in Moldova and Lithuania thwarted their governments' 
decision to boycott Moscow TV because they could not bear the thought of 
missing the ending of this melodrama. [16] Veronica Castro, the Mexican 
actress who played the soap opera's main character, emerged as one of 
the country's most popular personalities in the 1992 polls, placing right 
behind the country's president, head of government, and vice-president. 
There are several reasons why this run of the mill soap opera had such a 
hypnotic effect on the audience in the former Soviet Union . Perhaps the 
most compelling one is the full rehabilitation of the lowly -- mass -- 
culture in postindustrial societies, where it invariably supplants folklore as 
the archetypical mode of construction of social reality. Among the main 
feature distinguishing mass culture are nonambiguity of moral judgments, 
consistency of values, accepted wisdom of common sense, inescapability 
of suffering, and abiding optimism. Over sixty percent of TV viewers in the 
former Soviet Union who saw this soap opera (twice as many as any other 
TV program, including the news) gratefully clung to the helping hand 
extended to them by the Mexican producer. Disoriented, neglected, and 
scorned, the millions of Russian speaking viewers found in this 
unpretentious TV series the certainty they missed in their everyday life. 
The program allayed their fears before the menacing English-speaking 
civilization that threatens their life experience with the words like 
"voucher," "digest," broker," "impeachment," and "rating." It relieved 
their inferiority complex before high modernist culture and strengthened 
their heart in the face of an uncertain future. After watching this soap 
opera, many ex-Soviets could summon enough courage to say no to 
violence and sex that invaded their screens, to resist aggressive 
advertising and ruthless politicians. The Russians took close to heart Latin 
American culture because it appeared to them devoid of ethnic, economic, 
and generational differences. They felt more attuned to the problems 
facing the Salvators' family with its colorful array of dons and seignoritas 
than with their own reality shoved down their throats by the familiar 
political and artistic personages competing with each other for the dubious 
honor of painting the most dire scenario for the future. The simple folk 
who survived the Soviet regime know the difference between fiction and 
reality, yet they prefer to trust fiction which tells them that evil will be 
punished and loyalty rewarded, that in spite of its endless confusions and 
challenges -- life is really simple, that all people could be divided into two 
classes: angels and demons, and that the only problem is how to tell them 
apart. 
The Trial by Freedom: Prospects for Russian Artistic Market 
Soviet artistic culture has been often pictured in black and white colors: 
official art approved by the communist party, on the one hand, and 
unofficial, experimental art that flourished on the fringes of society, on the 
other. Looked at from the vantage point of the present, the reality seems 
more complex than common judgment allows. Compared to the market-
imposed uniformities, the art produced during the Soviet era now appears 
to be complex, nuanced, pluralistic, daring, and often inspired. It may be 
premature to talk about the decline of artistic culture in today's Russia , 
but we can attest to the precipitously declining public demand for art. 
When a book-salesman can earn twenty times as much as a writer and 
professor's salary is typically lower than his student's income, the public 
turns away from art and looks for other venues of personal growth. 
The drop in prestige of art is inevitable in a country where art served as a 
political club, research laboratory, psychological therapy, and performed 
numerous other functions not central to its mission. With the public 
redeploying its interests and resources toward material comfort, a slogan 
once issued by a 19th century aesthetic realist, D. I. Pisarev -- "boots are 
higher than Pushkin" -- seems to have come true. The status of art as an 
aesthetic force binding together the nation has been compromised, and 
along with it, the need to cultivate aesthetic sensibilities. Art has lost its 
power to confer prestige on its practitioners and connoisseurs. Your place 
in the group hierarchy depends on your ability to tell the difference 
between a Toyota and Nissan more than on your ability to distinguish 
between Sartre and Camus, it has more to do with your awareness of the 
Baskin Robbins ice cream flavors than with the fact that you have 
attended an exhibit featuring paintings from the Prado Museum. The "new 
Russians," resembling yuppies in their fondness for expensive suits and 
glitzy cars, are yearning not for tickets to attend a Tarkovsky's 
retrospective but for a vacation in the Bahamas . They cannot stand the 
intelligentsia's interminable kitchen debates about the country's future 
that used to absorb the country's cultural elite. Now, consumer culture 
supplants artistic culture, imported culture -- domestic culture, mass 
culture -- elite culture. The Russian artist can no longer hope to earn a 
living by selling his art to local consumers. To survive, he has to appeal to 
the state, shady businessmen, and foreign buyers. What would Russian 
film makers do without a money-laundrying sponsor, given the galloping 
inflation, dwindling ticket sales, the flood of pirated videos, and a virtual 
guarantee that any locally produced movie could not earn more than a 
quarter of its cost? [17]If current trends continue, Russian film makers 
will lose the last outlet for their artistic production -- national TV. 
We are witnessing the great historical experiment: the titanic struggle 
between Russian economic theory and practice, on the one hand, and a 
Western-style market economy, on the other. [18] If capitalist market 
laws prevail in Russia , we should see the Russian film industry coming to 
the brink of extinction. Already most of some five hundred movie studios 
in the country are without business. The result will be massive 
unemployment among artists, perhaps mitigated by the arrival of 
advertising agencies and other start-up businesses that could use artistic 
skills. [19] If things are allowed to drag on, Russia 's voodoo economics 
will avoid forging the bond between art industry and mass consumers. 
As ever, our best minds are tirelessly pondering the question how to build 
the market in postcommunist Russia , how to make the state serve its 
citizens instead of sacrificing individual interests to the state. Some point 
to precedents from the prerevolutinary era, when Russia made 
considerable strides toward the market under the able stewardship of 
Witte and Stolypin. As Gogol once lamented, Russia 's privileged fate is to 
skip the present and dream its way into the future. The fantastic blend of 
the old and new structures in today's Russia , of the legal and black 
markets, reflects the inertia of a centuries-old cultural tradition that 
stubbornly resists radical reforms. [20] But there is always hope. Unlike 
gas and oil, the nation's supply of renewable artistic talent is vast. 
Perhaps one day, the country will manage to put it to good use. Perhaps, 
it will even find a place within its own border for both mass and high 
culture, consumer and elite art. Meanwhile, the question persists when, if 
not whether, the country would develop a viable economics and at what 
price. As L. Nevler, student of culture, put it: "I know that the market has 
many advantages, but we should remember the inhospitable native soil 
where it is struggling to sink roots, our fabled capacity to make a mockery 
of the most wonderful ideas that we seek to adopt. How many times in the 
past did we feel foolish and idiotic after sowing one thing and harvesting 
something altogether different?" [21] 
The fate of art in Russia , both socialist and nonsocialist, tells us 
something important about society as a whole. We just need to figure out 
what could it possibly be? 
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